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Ship manoeuvring simulator 
A B S T R A C T   
The study presents a methodology that uses AIS data and a ship manoeuvring simulator to simulate and analyse 
marine traffic schemes with regard to risks for accidents. An event identification method is presented, which is 
needed for the accident scenario part of the methodology. This is based on AIS data, where the Great Belt VTS 
area was used to verify the methodology. Three events that could result in ship-bridge allisions were modelled 
and simulated in the simulator: drifting ship, sharp turning ship and miss of turning point. The Monte Carlo 
method was used to perform large number of simulator runs, including a parameter sensitivity analysis. The 
probability of a ship allision against the Great Belt Bridge was calculated to be 0.007. Analysis of the ship-bridge 
allision cases was shown to be dominated by the event drifting ship. This event has a relatively low kinetic energy 
at the impact, and the expected allision energy for a 1,000-year allision corresponds to a 178 m tanker with 
57,870 DWT and ship speed 14.6 knots. Finally, this study presents a mitigation analysis, which shows how the 
probability of allisions can be reduced by reducing the ship speed or altering the traffic separation scheme.   
1. Introduction 
The advancement in bridge building engineering during the 20th 
century created an opportunity to build large bridges that span over 
wide waterways with intensive ship traffic. Risk analysis was used as the 
method to ensure that the bridge design and waterway traffic fulfilled 
expected safety standards. Despite this, 34 major bridge collapses 
occurred in the period from 1960 to 2007 that were caused by ship- 
bridge allisions (def.: ship collision with a bridge), which resulted in 
the loss of more than 340 lives (AASHTO, 2009). In addition to envi-
ronmental and service loads that form the basis of the strength design of 
a bridge spanning over a waterway, the accidental probability of various 
hazardous events and accidental loads must also be considered. 
In Europe, the norms and standards for all building codes are 
described in the Eurocode. In Eurocode 1, general equations are pro-
posed for the calculation of accidental loads to be used in the design of 
bridges (CEN, 2006). For ship-bridge allisions, these equations are based 
on Eq. (1) with reference to the research presented by Fujii (1983) and 
Macduff (1974): 
NAl =N × PC (1)  
where NAl is the number of allisions, N is the number of ships and Pc is 
the causation factor. There is limited guidance in Eurocode 1 on how the 
causation factor should be determined. Pedersen (1995, 2000) proposed 
that it can be estimated using the number of accidents (or allisions for 
ship-bridge contacts) divided by the number of ship passages. Since this 
approach relies on the number of reported accidents and traffic statistics 
in the area of interest, the accuracy of the value of the calculated 
causation factor depends on these data. Hassel et al. (2011) and Psarros 
et al. (2010) found that only approximately 50 percent of all accidents 
are reported in accident statistics databases, hence, the causation factor 
is underestimated (and, thereby, the probability of accidents). 
This study presents a new methodology that handles the shortcom-
ings in the determination of the causation factor in the risk analysis. It 
uses the approach proposed by Hollnagel et al. (2006) to identify sce-
narios that lead to accidents, together with AIS data, to calculate the 
probability of ship collisions with fixed infrastructure; this approach is 
applied in the study as ship-bridge allision. Hollnagel et al. (2006) 
proposed that there are different “layers” leading to an accident that 
should be assessed: root cause, event and the accident itself. For 
example, an officer on watch falls asleep [root cause], the ship continues 
past a turning point [event] and ultimately grounds [accident]. The 
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availability of AIS data in combination with the layer approach is the 
key issue in the methodology presented in this study. 
Fujii (1983) and Macduff (1974) pioneered and established the basic 
theory for the current research field. At that time, AIS data were not 
available. The introduction and availability of AIS recordings have, ac-
cording to Svanberg et al. (2019), resulted in new possibilities to 
enhance the accuracy in maritime risk assessments. AIS data are, 
therefore, used in this study for two purposes: to represent the real traffic 
statistics of ships passing a waterway; and to benefit from reverse en-
gineering, where advanced numerical simulations are carried out to 
represent failure event statistics that are more valid compared to what 
has been reported (i.e. non-reported events and accidents can be 
captured and replicated). 
Computer-based simulation models have been used in the maritime 
field for decades. One example is Källström and Ramzan (1985), who 
used a combination of simulation models and model tests to install the 
world’s first commercial Tension Leg Platform. Nowadays, there are 
various types of maritime simulation models and software for different 
purposes. One simulation model that includes the [event] failure is the 
Maritime Transportation System (MTS) model. This model handles the 
ships’ temporospatial positions in a time-domain simulation, but the 
hydrodynamic forces are not calculated, making it relatively fast and 
straightforward to use. This type of simulator was used by Ulusçu et al. 
(2009), who studied the risk of accident in the Strait of Istanbul. van 
Dorp and Merrick (2011) proposed using the MTS model for risk as-
sessments in coastal areas. In this model, the traffic was simulated on 
routes obtained from AIS data, and the ship failures and errors in the 
model were simulated based on expert opinions. Goerlandt and Kujala 
(2011) continued this research and implemented the DMTS model. This 
simulator is also based on AIS data, but it addresses the meeting situa-
tions differently. Goerlandt and Kujala (2011) used a Monte Carlo 
method to estimate the risk of collision and grounding in the Gulf of 
Finland. Rasmussen et al. (2012) used the ShipRisk software to quantify 
the risk to ship traffic in the Fehmarnbelt fixed link project. This soft-
ware is a mixture of the models by Pedersen (1995) and an MTS simu-
lator. In Rasmussen et al. (2012), the probability of human error, loss of 
propulsion, and steering machine failure were analysed. 
The purpose of the study is to present new methodology using AIS 
data and a ship manoeuvring simulator to calculate the accident prob-
abilities in marine traffic near bridges spanning over wide waterways. 
The methodology is verified in a case study on grounding accidents. Its 
wider applicability is presented in a demonstration study where the 
probability of ship-bridge allisions is calculated. With the proposed 
methodology, it can be numerically shown which ships and traffic sit-
uations that are over-represented in failure event analyses; hence, 
mitigation actions can be proposed that reduce the risk of accidents. It 
can also be used to identify candidate ships that should be used as 
“target” ships in bridge concept designs, to ensure sufficient bridge 
structural strength that can withstand the kinetic energy impacting the 
bridge; see Sha and Amdahl (2019). 
In the proposed methodology, there is no equation that estimates the 
number of allisions; this is the major difference compared to methods 
based on Eq. (1). The number of simulations is calculated by equations, 
but the simulations give the number of allisions. Another difference 
compared to previous research is that the methodology includes 
methods to obtain location-specific failure events regarding both dura-
tion and frequency. The proposed methodology can thus be applied to 
study risk mitigation options in location-specific areas. Note, however, 
that a limitation is that only single ships can be studied in each simu-
lation. This is because the event statistics are gathered from single-ship 
situations, and it is challenging to model all human decisions that could 
be made in an autopilot logic. Apart from the probability of allision, the 
methodology also enables estimations of the design energy the structure 
needs to withstand. This is possible since the kinetic energy just before 
the allision is captured for all simulated allisions. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Chapter 2 
presents the overall methodology, including a brief description of the 
ship manoeuvre simulator. Chapter 3 introduces the simulation sce-
narios in the study, which have been defined for verification and 
demonstration purposes of the methodology. The event statistics used in 
these scenarios are presented in Chapter 4. A presentation of the simu-
lation setup in the ship manoeuvre simulator are presented in Chapter 5 
together with the case study area, followed by results and discussions of 
the analyses in Chapter 6. The conclusions are presented in Chapter 7. 
2. Methodology 
The methodology in the study integrates modern simulation and 
analysis tools to ensure safe and robust designs when new bridges that 
span over waterways are built. It should be noted that it can also be used 
to assess existing bridges if they fulfil today’s design and safety criteria, 
or if mitigation actions need to be activated. This is justified since the 
majority of the bridges that exist were built several decades ago. They 
were designed based on the marine traffic that was present at that time, 
considering an extrapolation of its increase and the ideas of which ships 
that would be built in the future. It is likely that the assumptions that 
formed the basis for safety factors in the bridge design are not aligned 
with today’s marine traffic situation and sizes of ships. One similar 
example where the design criteria had become obsolete is the design of 
the twin towers of the World Trade Centre in New York (USA) and the 
attack they were subjected to on September 11, 2001. The two towers 
were designed and constructed in the 1960s to withstand an airplane 
crash. However, 40 years later, both the size of the aircrafts and the 
amount of fuel they carry had increased significantly more than ex-
pected in the scenarios they were designed to withstand (El-Naby et al., 
2014). 
The methodology in this study has three major parts: collection of 
AIS data, analysis of AIS data for event definition and modelling, and 
modelling and simulation of events in a ship manoeuvre simulator. The 
AIS data are used to collect both event and general traffic statistics. 
Based on the event statistics, different event models are proposed to be 
used as input to the simulator, where the evolvement of events is 
simulated and analysed. It should be noted that one advantage of using a 
ship manoeuvre simulator is that not all of the events that are introduced 
or triggered actually lead to an accident. The simulator can thus help us 
to understand why some events did not result in an accident. It can be 
used in investigations as forensic analysis of accidents that actually 
happened, or it can be used to simulate and analyse the consequence of 
mitigation actions. A schematic of the methodology is shown in Fig. 1; 
see Chapter 3 for more details how the AIS data are investigated and 
Chapter 5 for more details and a presentation of the simulation setup in 
Fig. 7. 
2.1. Ship manoeuvre simulator 
The SEAMAN ship manoeuvre simulator, which was developed by 
SSPA (http://www.sspa.se), was used in this study. The simulator is a 
software code where the ship’s motions are modelled in all six degrees- 
of-freedom. It is a module-based software where the definition of the 
ship model’s characteristics is divided into subsystems, e.g. the hull, 
engine, propeller and rudder. The simulator includes spatial-temporal 
subsystems and numerical codes that calculate the forces acting on the 
ship that are induced by the wind, waves and currents; shallow water 
and bank effects are also considered (Andreasson et al., 2005; Ottosson 
and Bystrom, 1991). Total force equilibrium of the ship model is solved 
in a nonlinear mathematical model in every time step according to a 
procedure presented in Ottosson (1994). 
A SEAMAN ship model requires several hundreds of parameters to 
accurately represent a ship and its characteristics in the simulator. A 
ship’s hydrodynamics and resistance properties can be fine-tuned if test 
data are available from model testing. When new models are defined in 
the simulator, a procedure for parameter sensitivity study of the ship 
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model’s parameters is always carried out. For example, to ensure that 
the manoeuvrability of the ships used in this study was correctly 
modelled in SEAMAN, each ship model was simulated and verified 
against the zig-zag and turning circle tests from the IMO’s “Standards for 
ship manoeuvrability” (IMO, 2002). Running these tests in a simulation 
context have also been applied by others like Budak and Beji (2020), 
who used the tests to ensure the ship’s manoeuvrability while imple-
menting a course-keeping autopilot. 
Fig. 2 presents a screen shot from a simulation when the simulator is 
run in desktop mode in real time. It can also be run in batch mode with 
an autopilot navigating the ship according to a pre-defined route, failure 
event or simulation scenario determined by the user. The batch mode 
was used in this study since it significantly reduced the simulation time 
and there was no need to survey the simulations in real time on a screen. 
It was also a necessity because of the large number of simulations carried 
out using the Monte Carlo method; see Chapters 5 and 6. 
3. Definition and identification of failure events using AIS 
Simulation and analysis of ship accidents and their causes can be 
carried out in multiple ways. Pedersen (1995, 2020) proposed a method 
based on the work of Fujii (1983) and Macduff (1974). In this method, 
Fig. 1. Schematic of the methodology presented in the study.  
Fig. 2. Example from a SEAMAN simulator run in desktop mode (screen shot). It shows the history of the ship’s manoeuvres when it leaves the port and its nav-
igation trajectory when it enters the fairway. 
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situations are defined that can result in an accident, an approach that 
has been applied by among others Montewka et al. (2012) and Goerlandt 
and Kujala (2011). Pedersen’s situation-based approach can be effi-
ciently used in mathematical models that do not involve or need a ship 
manoeuvring simulator or detailed modelling of the ship’s motions and 
dynamics. However, one shortcoming is that it relies on historical 
events/accidents and data for known traffic situations and ships, which 
often are related to very low probabilities, and, hence the method is 
sensitive to the access to and quality of data (Chen et al., 2019). The 
advantage of the approach is that analyses can be made with low 
modelling and computation efforts, which often are suitable in risk an-
alyses that involve the Monte Carlo method. 
The ship manoeuvre simulator presented in Chapter 2 was used in 
this study instead of Pedersen’s approach. The advantage of the simu-
lator approach is that it opens up new possibilities to simulate, assess 
and execute risk analysis of existing and future marine traffic situations 
that may involve infrastructure offshore. The gain of this approach is 
that specific details of the trace from event to accident can be obtained 
and analysed. This includes data of ship types, weather situations, ship 
operation profiles, fairway layouts and infrastructure objects, which can 
be modelled and systematically varied in parametric studies; it does not 
need an explicit value or expression of the causation factor, which is 
required in Pedersen’s approach. The drawback is that it requires some 
more modelling and computation efforts, but the simulator software 
used in this study offers batch mode simulations to overcome the chal-
lenge. In addition, instead of defining and analysing accidents, three 
types of events are identified in the study as relevant and critical for 
ship-bridge allisions in relatively narrow waterways: drifting of the ship, 
sharp turning of a ship and miss of a turning point. They are similar to 
the categorisation presented in Ulusçu et al. (2009), van Dorp and 
Merrick (2011) and Rassmusen et al. (2012); see a discussion in Chapter 
6.4 for other types of events. 
The AIS data of the marine traffic in the area are needed to model, 
simulate and analyse the events. Since 2002, ships larger than 300 gross 
tonnes must have an AIS transponder, which means that this informa-
tion has been available after 2002. AIS messages are separated in two 
message types: position report and metadata message (Raymond, 2019). 
At sea, every ship issues a position report every 2–10 s, depending on the 
ship’s speed and turning rate. In this study, this information is handled 
both as “single points” and after post-processing as “trajectories”, 
defined by multiple points and represented by lines connecting similar 
points. The trajectories then contain data from both the position reports 
and the metadata messages data and are stored in a PostgreSQL database 
with the spatial extension PostGIS. For more details about how the 
trajectories were constructed with a Douglas-Peucker compression, see 
Hörteborn et al. (2019) or a similar method presented in Zhao and Shi 
(2019) and Wei et al. (2020). 
The following subchapters present how AIS data were used to 
quantify frequencies and durations for the three events of drifting ship, 
sharp turning ship and miss of turning point. Each subchapter ends with 
a summary of how the simulation of the event was implemented in the 
simulator’s autopilot. In short, the event identification using AIS data 
was carried out in two steps. First, an automatic filter with specified 
conditions that helped define an event was applied to the AIS trajec-
tories, followed by a second manual step applied to the remaining tracks 
that could not be identified as a clear event among the three categories. 
Events identified by the AIS data were also used in the process of cali-
brating the autopilot’s behaviour, for example, related to the time to 
turn off the steering system and lock the rudder’s position. 
3.1. Event “drifting ship” 
The drifting ship event is defined as a ship that appears to drift with 
the waves, the wind and the current with no possibility to turn on its 
engine. It is assumed that the probability that the drifting ship event will 
occur is the same along the fairway; see Furnes and Amdahl (1980), 
Rasmussen et al. (2012) and Kaneko (2012). 
The AIS data were used to identify drifting ships by following the AIS 
trajectories and applying the following criteria as filters:  
• speed over ground (SOG): should be less than 2 knots.  
• course over ground (COG): should differ more than 20◦ from the 
heading.  
• duration: longer than 5 min. 
Each candidate ship that fulfilled these criteria was manually 
checked to ensure that there were no obvious reasons for their drifting 
behaviour, which would then result in the candidate being removed 
from the sample. Examples of such candidates that should be excluded as 
drifting ships are slow steaming ships and ships that intervene with 
other ships, e.g. ships that pickup pilots or change crew. The duration of 
the event for a drifting ship was defined by the position report where the 
ship started to lose speed (or its last known position) to the position 
report where the ship recovered control and started to either pick up 
speed again or anchored. 
In the simulator, a drifting ship is modelled as fully operational for 
the first 60 s in a simulation case whereafter the propulsion system is 
turned off. At this instant, the ship begins to lose speed, and the autopilot 
tries to keep the ship’s course on track for as long as possible. This setup 
correlates with the most common ship behaviours from AIS data ob-
servations from the ship traffic studied in Chapter 4; complete blackout 
(including the steering engine) was not observed. The simulation in the 
simulator continues for the duration of the event, which can either be 
the duration as measured from AIS data (see above), from a pre-defined 
time by the user when the propulsion system is turned on again, or when 
the ship is anchored. In this study, the first option was used. Fig. 3 shows 
an example from a comparison of results from a simulator simulation 
(green ship contours) and the real AIS track (grey ship contours) for the 
same case of a drifting ship. This example shows that the simulator 
almost replicates the AIS track. 
3.2. Event “sharp turning ship” 
The sharp turning ship event is defined as a ship that may suffer from 
a malfunction in the rudder giving rise to a locked rudder that turns the 
ship distinctly to starboard or port; see Pedersen et al. (2020) for the 
category III type of accident for a similar situation or event. In the 
current study, it is assumed that when this event occurs, the ship de-
creases its speed to gain time to repair/fix the rudder problem. When the 
ship’s speed decreases, and there is no rudder effect that can be 
controlled by the crew, it looks as if the ship is drifting in the AIS data. 
Thus, the principles and filters used to identify drifting ships can initially 
be applied to identify candidates for the current event. To distinguish 
this event from the event drifting ship, the following complementary 
criteria are used:  
• a ship that continuously loses its speed, without an instant sharp 
turn, is categorised as a candidate for the event drifting ship.  
• a ship that starts its drifting with an instant turn and has a rudder 
malfunction is categorised as a candidate for the event sharp turning 
ship. 
The duration of the sharp turning ship event for a ship was defined by 
the position reported where the ship started to turn sharply, to the po-
sition reported where the ship recovered control and started to either 
pick up speed again or anchored. 
Modelling this event in the simulator is challenging, since, in reality, 
the crew of a ship will react and act differently in each scenario to a 
malfunction of the rudder. Nevertheless, the simulator setup to simulate 
this event is in the study is defined as a fully operational ship the first 60 
s of the simulation case whereafter the rudder is set to either full star-
board or full port. After another 60 s in the simulation, the engine is 
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turned off, and after another 5 min, the rudder is assumed functional 
again and set to mid ship position. This sequence, times and behaviours 
were determined from the authors’ experiences from analyses of AIS 
data, parametric studies in the simulator and attempts to mimic real 
events in the simulator’s environment. Fig. 4 shows an example from a 
comparison of results from a simulator simulation (green ship contours) 
and the real AIS track (red ship contours) for the same case of a sharp 
turning ship. The turn is initiated with constant speed, indicating that it 
is a sharp turning point event and not a case of loss of propulsion (i.e. 
drifting event). This example shows that the simulator almost replicates 
the AIS track for this event. 
3.3. Event “miss of turning point” 
The miss of turning point event is defined as a ship that continues 
straight ahead, passing a marked or expected turning point, but manages 
to correct its course later to the main navigation lane; see Pedersen et al. 
(2020) for the category II type of accident for a similar situation or 
event. The event is exemplified in Fig. 5, where the blue line shows a 
ship (traveling from south west to north east), failing to follow the 
expected/normal traffic behaviour. The ship passes through the border 
(line 3) of the Traffic Separation Scheme (TSS). After some time, the 
“mistake” is observed, and the ship turns back to the main navigation 
lane of the fairway. The reason for the occurrence of this event can have 
various root causes, such as fatigued crew (falling asleep), rudder stuck 
mid ship, human errors during navigation, etc. 
The AIS data were used to identify miss of turning point ships by 
following the AIS trajectories and applying the following criteria as fil-
ters, here presented related to the example in Fig. 5: 
Fig. 3. Drifting ship event: simulated track (contours plotted in green, one 
position every 20 s connected with a blue line) overlaid the real AIS data 
(contours plotted in grey). (For interpretation of the references to colour in this 
figure legend, the reader is referred to the Web version of this article.) 
Fig. 4. Sharp turning ship: simulated track (contours plotted in green, one 
position every 20 s connected with a blue line) overlaid the real AIS data 
(contours plotted in red). (For interpretation of the references to colour in this 
figure legend, the reader is referred to the Web version of this article.) 
Fig. 5. An example of a ship that fails to turn at a marked turning point; the 
example is taken from the TSS Bornholmsgat area. 
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• the ship should cross the pre-defined TSS border lines, i.e. the border 
lines 1, 3 and 4 in Fig. 5.  
• the COG should differ less than 5◦ between the crossing of lines 1 and 
3.  
• the SOG should differ less than 1 knot between the crossing of lines 1 
and 3. 
Similar to the other event categories, every ship that fulfilled these 
criteria was manually checked to ensure that there were no obvious or 
other reasons for its behaviour and choice of path. For example, a ship 
with a distance smaller than its own ship domain to another ship was 
excluded, since its path could have been affected by the other ship (i.e. 
intentional and voluntary miss of turning point to avoid an incident). 
The definition of the size of the ship domain followed the method pre-
sented in Hörteborn et al. (2019). 
The duration of the miss of turning point event for a ship was defined 
by the position of the expected turning point and the position reported 
where the ship actually turned. The expected turning point here is the 
point where the majority of all ships turn to follow the TSS; see line 2 in 
Fig. 5, which marks when ships are supposed to make the turn in the 
example. 
Modelling this event in the simulator was done in the case study as 
follows. The ship is run as expected during the initial 2 min of the 
simulation in order to ensure that it is on the correct navigation path. 
After that, the autopilot is turned off, and the rudder is locked in mid- 
ship position and remains so for the remaining time duration of the 
event. 
4. Event statistics 
This chapter present event statistics and durations for the events 
defined in Chapter 3. The case study presented in Chapters 5 and 6 
emphasises the Great Belt VTS area. However, in this chapter, the sta-
tistics and analyses of the TSS Bornholmsgat area and the results re-
ported in Rasmussen et al. (2012) are included for comparison purposes. 
The AIS data were based on the marine traffic in the Great Belt VTS 
and TSS Bornholmsgat areas during the period 2014 to 2019 obtained 
from DMA (2020). The data were analysed with the methodology pre-
sented in Chapter 3. Rasmussen et al. (2012) presented their results for 
“human failure” in the Kadetrenden area using AIS data from 2007 to 
2010, and their statistics for “loss of propulsion” and “steering machine 
failure” were based on four years of incident reports from the Great Belt 
VTS. 
4.1. Event frequencies 
It assumed that the probability of occurrence and the duration of the 
events defined in Chapter 3 are independent of ship type and size. In 
total, 153 events were identified in the Great Belt VTS and TSS Born-
holmsgat areas using the event identification methods described in 
Chapter 3. Table 1 presents a summary of the number of events for each 
event category, together with the number of sailing hours that were used 
to identify the “drifting ship” and “sharp turning ship”. Two waypoints 
in these areas were used to define the event “miss of turning point”, and 
the number of turns at these waypoints are also presented in the table. 
The frequency for “drifting ship” and “sharp turning ship” was 
calculated by dividing the number of events with the number of sailing 
hours. The “miss of turning point” frequency was calculated by dividing 
the number of events with the number of ships making the turn. These 
frequencies together with the data from Rasmussen et al. (2012) are 
shown in Table 2. 
The event frequency for “drifting ship” is in same order of magnitude 
in the three studies. The values for the Great Belt VTS and Rasmussen 
et al. (2012) show very good agreement; thus, the method described in 
Chapter 3.1 for this event was considered verified. The lower value for 
the Great Belt VTS area compared to the TSS Bornholmsgat area is due to 
the ships in the former area being able to manoeuvre more easily and 
safely and anchor outside the fairway if they experience minor trouble, 
such as a partial blackout. It should be noted that with the event iden-
tification method presented in Chapter 3.1, it is not possible to differ-
entiate these events from planned anchoring. In the case study in 
Chapter 5, simulations and analyses of the Great Belt VTS area, this 
event’s frequency was set to 0.65 × 10− 4/hour. 
The event frequency for “sharp turning ship” differs some between 
the different studies. However, only two cases were identified for the 
two studies in the Great Belt VTS area, which are too few to rely on when 
generating statistics. It was assumed that the value of this event’s fre-
quency should be somewhat lower than the average value from the three 
studies, it was set to 0.070 × 10− 4/hour. A sensitivity analysis in which 
this event’s frequency is increased 50 percent is presented in Chapter 
6.4. 
The event frequency for “miss of turning point” shows relatively 
good conformity between the three studies; the value from Rasmussen 
et al. (2012) is, instead of calculating the event frequency in terms of 
occurrences per turn, based on “human failure” and event frequency per 
hour as the unit. Based on the same reasons as for the “drifting ship” 
event, an event frequency of 1.55 × 10− 4/turn was used in the simula-
tions and analyses in Chapter 5. However, it should be noted the dura-
tion time of the event was found to be notably different between these 
three studies, see the following chapter for the analysis. 
4.2. Event durations 
The definition of the duration of each event was defined in Chapter 3. 
Fig. 6 presents a summary of the durations for the “drifting ship” and 
“sharp turning ship” event categories. The symbols in the figure repre-
sent results from the AIS data processing, while the lines represent fitted 
curves according to the distributions presented in Table 3. For the 
former category, the results are presented separately for the Great Belt 
VTS, the TSS Bornholmsgat and Rasmussen et al. (2012). For the sharp 
turning ship event, there were too few cases in the Great Belt VTS and 
the TSS Bornholmsgat areas to make a distribution. To overcome this 
was six event durations from a third area, the Kiel Canal, included to 
make this distribution (this area is discussed in Chapter 6.5). However, 
the event had similar durations in all areas, so they were fitted to one 
common distribution representing the event. 
The results in the figure show that the duration of the drifting ship 
event is the shortest in the Great Belt VTS area. It can be explained by the 
fact that this area offers the best opportunity to anchor. The event 
Table 1 
Number of events, hours and turns in respective area.  
Data analysis Great Belt VTS TSS Bornholmsgat 
Number of drifting ship events 34 65 
Number of sharp turning ship events 2 5 
Number of sailing hours 522,296 713,531 
Number of miss of turning point events 19 26 
Number of turns at waypoints 122,319 124,705  
Table 2 
Summary of event frequencies where * refers to “loss of propulsion”, ** to 
“steering machine failure” and *** to “human failure” in Rasmussen et al. 
(2012).  
Event category Great Belt VTS TSS 
Bornholmsgat 
Rasmussen et al. 
(2012) 
Drifting ship 0.65 × 10− 4/ 
hour 
0.91 × 10− 4/hour 0.6 × 10− 4/hour* 
Sharp turning 
ship 
0.038 × 10− 4/ 
hour 
0.092 × 10− 4/ 
hour 
0.1 × 10− 4/hour** 
Miss of turning 
point 
1.55 × 10− 4/ 
turn 
2.10 × 10− 4/turn 2.5 × 10− 4/hour***  
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category “miss of turning point” is not included in the figure, but its 
statistical distributions are presented in Table 3. 
4.3. Accident statistics in the areas 
Collection of accident statistics in the Great Belt VTS area was 
emphasised since this area was used in the simulator case study in 
Chapter 5. Three sources were used to ensure that the majority of ac-
cidents reported between 2010 and 2019 in the area were collected. In 
the accident records of IHS Fairplay (2020), five strandings, two colli-
sions, one contact and one fire accident were reported. In addition to 
these accidents, the Norwegian Maritime Authority (Sjofartsdirektor-
atet, 2020) reported one fire accident, and no additional accidents were 
found reported in the EMCIP database (EMCIP, 2020). 
Fig. 6. Duration of the events drifting ship (individually: Great Belt VTS, TSS Bornholmsgat, Rasmussen et al. (2012)) and sharp turning ship (summary of all: Kiel 
Canal, Great Belt VTS, Bornholmsgat TTS). The dots represent the measurements, and the lines are the result of the curve fitting presented in Table 3. 
Fig. 7. Schematic of deterministic (d) and randomly generated (mc) parameters in the SEAMAN simulator simulations.  
Table 3 
Statistical distributions and their parameters for duration of events (time in 
hours). The parameters correspond to σ = standard deviation, ι = location, λ =
scale and μ = mean value.  




Rasmussen et al. 
(2012) 
Drifting ship Lognormal 
σ = 0.71 
ι = 0.021 
λ = 0.69 
Lognormal 
σ = 0.87 
ι = 0.1 
λ = 0.97 
Weibull 
σ = 0.5 
λ = 0.605 
Sharp turning ship Lognormal: σ = 1.2; ι = 0.06 λ =
0.54 
n/a 
Miss of turning 
point 
Normal 
μ = 0.064 
σ = 0.015 
Normal 
μ = 0.19 
σ = 0.047 
Less than 0.33  
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5. Description of simulator simulations and case study 
The chapter presents a case study where the SEAMAN simulator was 
used to simulate and analyse the marine traffic situation in the Great Belt 
VTS area. Chapter 5.1 presents how the simulator simulations were 
planned and setup followed by specific details and descriptions of the 
case study in Chapter 5.2. 
5.1. Simulator simulations and setup 
The simulations in the SEAMAN simulator were run in sets, where 
each set contained 90 batches of simulations. The 90 batches were based 
on three event categories, 15 types of ships and two directions of ship 
routes; see Chapter 3 for event categorisation and Chapter 5.2 for ship 
types and route directions specific for the case study marine traffic 
situation. 
The number of simulations in each batch, for the drifting ship and 






Pft,i × NCat,jk × tN,jk × YR (2)  
where NSim,i is the number of simulations for event i (1 = drifting ship; 2 
= sharp turning ship), Pft,i is the event probability per hour for the event 
under study (see event frequency in Chapter 4.1), NCat,j,k is the estimated 
number of ships per year for ship type j on a route k in the area, tN,j,k is 
the average time ship type j sails on the route k, and YR is the number of 
repetitions of one year’s traffic the simulation should represent. 
The starting position of a ship in a simulation for an event varied 
between the simulations. It was assumed that the starting position of a 
ship (i.e. its position in the fairway when the simulation starts) follows 
the traffic separation scheme and spatially follows an even distribution 
along the route. The distance between starting positions, Dsp,ijk, was 
calculated according to Eq. (3), where NSim,i was calculated according to 




The number of simulations in each batch for the miss of turning point 






PCSA,i × NCat,jk × NT,jk × YR. (4)  
where PCSA,i is the probability that a ship misses a turn, and NT,jk is the 
number of turns the ship j makes on its route k. According to Chapter 3.3, 
these simulations started 2 min prior to the point where the turn was 
missed; a turning point was laterally distributed in accordance with their 
unique route. 
The majority of the simulator simulations ended without ship 
grounding or ship-bridge allision. However, for the simulations that 
ended with an allision, the allision energy was calculated according to 
Eq. (5), where M is the ship’s displacement, v the ship speed and E is the 
allision energy. Note that this is the largest theoretical energy that may 
cause damage to the ship and the bridge structures, since the formula is 
simplistic it does not include detailed energy distribution which could be 
studied by external dynamics simulations; see Yu et al. (2016) and Lu 




A central part of the presented methodology is the bridge design 
criteria. According to Johansen and Askeland (2019), there are different 
ways to interpret these criteria where the authors proposed to use of an 
FN-curve to better represent both the probability and the consequence. 
In this study, a risk criterion with a threshold of 1 × 10− 3 was selected, 
which means that a bridge struck by a ship should withstand and survive 
allisions with a probability level of 1 × 10− 3. The procedure to identify 
ships that follow this criterion was as follows. The allision energies from 
a complete simulation set in the simulator were sorted from the highest 
to lowest. The probability for the worst allision in the same set of sim-
ulations is then 1/YR, and the second worst (or worse) has a probability 
of occurring 2/YR. For this analogy, with simulator simulations of YR =
10,000 times, the 10th worst allision corresponds to the worst allision 
that has the highest probability to occur in 1,000 years. If YR is increased 
to 100,000, the 100th worst allision corresponds to the allision energy 
with a probability to occur corresponding to 1 × 10− 3. 
The SEAMAN simulator has two major parts in the simulator model: 
a model of the ship and a model of the environment (called “world”). 
Fig. 7 presents a schematic of the parameters of these models that have 
either been deterministic, d, or randomly generated, mc, in Monte Carlo 
simulations. The deterministic parameters were the three batch pa-
rameters (i.e. event categories, ship types and direction on route), and 
the seven randomly generated parameters were described by statistical 
distributions. 
5.2. Case study: the Great Belt VTS area 
The chapter presents the case study area in detail. It is presented 
from which the values and settings of the parameters lateral offset, 
route, ship, ship speeds and environmental variables were collected. The 
properties of the events were presented in Chapter 3 and their durations 
in Chapter 4.2. 
The Great Belt VTS was chosen as the case study area since it has 
been studied by other researchers from a ship-bridge allision perspec-
tive; for an example, see Gluver and Olsen (1998). According to statistics 
in accident databases, numerous groundings in the area have been re-
ported during the past few years (EMSA, 2019), and historic AIS data are 
available for the area (DMA, 2020). Fig. 8 presents a map of the marine 
traffic passing the area, and Fig. 9 presents histograms of the distribution 
in ship length, ship speed and lateral distribution for the marine traffic 
that passed the Great Belt Bridge during 2019. The marine traffic is 
spread laterally over the fairway, which, according to IALA (2014), can 
be represented by the normal distribution. In this study, this distribution 
is checked/updated at every waypoint for all traffic in 2019 since the 
properties of the distribution may vary in the fairway (here, called 
offset). By means of the offset (normal) distributions, indicated as 
Lateral offsetmc in Fig. 7, a unique route could be generated for each 
simulator simulation. 
Most of the traffic that passes the area follows the south-north T- 
route. It is divided into a deep water route and a normal route, see Fig. 8. 
Statistics of the marine traffic in the area during 2019 shows that 19,507 
ships passed under the Great Belt Bridge, divided into 7,225 general 
cargo ships, 5,242 tanker ships, 2,094 RoPax/RoRo ships, 1,488 
container ships, 1,484 bulk carriers and 1,974 unknown ship types. The 
length distribution of each ship type is presented in Fig. 10. 
The results in the figure were used to define 15 representative ships 
in the simulator that together reflected the marine traffic in the area 
during 2019. Table 4 presents some of the ships specifics, ship speed 
(normally distributed, Speedsmc in Fig. 7) and the number of ships going 
north and south (NCat in Eqs (2) and (4)). The three largest ships with 
regards to draught—Bulk, 226 m; Tanker, 241 m; Tanker, 260 m—used 
the deep water route in Fig. 8; all other ships use the normal route. 
5.3. Metocean statistics for the Great Belt VTS area 
The metocean statistics for the area were downloaded from the 
Copernicus Marine Service (2020). The wind statistics for the period 
2015 to 2020 are presented in Fig. 11 as a wind rose plot for the location 
latitude 55.25◦ and longitude 11.0◦. The current statistics for the period 
2016 to 2020 are presented in Fig. 12 as a current rose plot for the 
location latitude 55.2◦ and longitude 11.0◦. The data in the rose plots are 
used to define the wind and current loads in the simulator model; see 
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Fig. 7. 
The length of a colour bar in Fig. 11 indicates the probability of a 
specific wind speed and wind direction. For example, the wind di-
rections around 11 percent of the time are from the south-west, where 
the wind speed is 2.5 percent of the time less than 3 m/s, 6 percent of the 
time between 3 and 6 m/s, 3 percent of the time between 6 and 9 m/s, 
and less than 0.5 percent of the time it is faster than 9 m/s. The wind rose 
plot in Fig. 11 shows that the dominant wind directions are from the 
west and the south-west, and that the wind speed is often below 9 m/s. 
Wind speeds larger than 9 m/s come from the west and sometimes from 
the east, but rarely from other directions. The current rose plot in Fig. 12 
shows that there are currents in the area that are dominated by the di-
rections north north-west and south south-east. 
Forces from secondary waves induce drift forces on ships, and waves 
up to 2 m have some effects on a ship’s manoeuvrability (Chillcce and el 
Moctar, 2018). The probability to encounter different wave heights in 
the range 0–2.5 m in the area is presented in Fig. 13. This figure show 
that the probability to encounter waves larger than 1.5 m is very low, i.e. 
waves have a minor effect on a ship’s manoeuvrability in the area. 
Hence, it was assumed that waves could be disregarded in the simulator 
model, which also reduce the computational efforts (less simulation 
time). To conclude, the influence from wind and current have a great 
effect on the drift force, and, hence, they were included in the simulator 
model, which, in this study, was defined as a four degrees-of-freedom 
ship model (heave and pitch were not considered). 
6. Results 
The simulator runs were defined in three categories divided into ten 
simulation sets for (i) investigation of the influence from random seeds 
in the generation of random variables, (ii) a sensitivity study of the 
parameters, and (iii) demonstration of examples of risk mitigation; see 
Table 5 for an overview of all simulation sets. The simulation of a single 
ship’s voyage took approximately 2 s on an Intel Core i7-2600 3.4 GHz 
processor with 16 GB RAM memory and 64Bit architecture. One set of 
simulations consist of some four million ship voyages, which needed 
approximately 80 h to complete using eight processors. 
The three sets, 1A, 1B and 1C, relate to the random seed study. They 
have the same input, but the random seed for the generation of random 
variables (mc in Fig. 7) is varied, which resulted in different values of the 
random variables. Hence, by defining the random seed, a simulation 
could be reproduced, ensuring that new combinations of random vari-
ables were generated (Harris et al., 2020). The number of simulations 
needed in the set was determined by a criterion defined in this study 
stating that the difference in allision energy between the simulation sets 
should not differ more than five percent. 
The five sets in 2–4 in Table 5 were defined for sensitivity study 
analysis purposes in which the probabilities and duration time of the 
events were studied. The input data were based on the TSS Born-
holmsgat area. One set investigated the increased probability and 
duration time of the event drifting ship, and another set investigated a 
fifty percent increase in probability of the event sharp turning ship. The 
miss of turning point event was separated into three sets: increase of 
both probability and duration time, increase of only the probability and 
increase of only the duration time. 
Sets 5 and 6 were defined and used in examples of risk mitigation to 
demonstrate how the methodology presented in the study can be uti-
lised. In set 5, a speed limitation of 12 knots was enforced, and in set 6, 
the navigation path was altered to force the traffic to navigate 2.6 
nautical miles straight prior to the Great Belt Bridge instead of 1.6 
nautical miles, which is the normal navigation path. 
6.1. Analysis of the number of simulated traffic years (YR) 
Sets 1A, 1B and 1C were used to investigate how many traffic years 
(YR) need to be simulated according to the discussion in Chapter 5.1. 
Table 6 presents the results from the simulator simulations with YR =
10,000 traffic years (or repetitions of one year). There is a difference in 
the number of groundings and allisions because of the different random 
seeds, which also affects the maximum allision energy and the 1,000- 
year allision energy for each simulation set. As described in Chapter 
5.1 the 1,000-year allision energy represents the worst allision that has a 
probability of 1 × 10− 3 to occur. Because the 1,000-year allision energy 
differs more than 30 percent between the sets, YR was too low and was 
increased to 100,000. The results from these simulations are presented 
in Table 7. They show that the number of groundings is, on average, 
50,887. This gives a probability of 0.51 groundings per year, which, 
compared to the accident statistics for the area, demonstrates a good 
agreement since five groundings were reported during a ten-year period 
(see Chapter 4.3). The average number of allisions is 721, which gives a 
probability of 0.007 allisions per year, or one allision every 139 years. 
Fig. 8. Map presenting the marine traffic in the Great Belt VTS area.  
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The 1,000-year allision energy shows some difference between the sets, 
but the deviation is less than five percent, which is acceptable. The 
average allision energy was calculated to 1,624 MJ, which represents a 
178 m tanker with 57,870 DWT at ship speed 14.6 knots. 
6.2. Analysis of the duration time parameter 
Fig. 14 presents the results from an analysis of all simulations in 
simulation set 1A in Table 7, emphasising the influence from the 
parameter duration time in the three event categories. The green line 
represents the distribution of all simulations, while the blue dotted and 
the red dashed lines represent the distributions for the events that ended 
in grounding or allision accidents, respectively. The results show that 
the duration time in the drifting ship event had a small influence 
compared to the overall distribution and probability that lead to an 
allision. The duration time had a minor influence on the sharp turning 
ship event results, but there was a large effect with regard to the miss of 
turning point event. Simulations with a longer duration time show a 
larger probability for grounding and allision accidents. The miss of 
turning point thus shows the highest probability for a grounding or 
allision accident. Fig. 15 presents the results from simulation set 1A to 
illustrate the paths of ships that collided with the bridge. Using the 
methodology presented in this study and these results, it is possible to 
propose and analyse mitigation actions that can help reduce or possibly 
avoid ship-bridge allisions. 
6.3. Analysis of two mitigation methods 
Two mitigations were analysed by simulation sets 5 and 6: reduction 
of maximum allowed ship speed and change of point where ships should 
make an earlier turn (change navigation path) to pass under the bridge, 
respectively. These two mitigation options were included to showcase 
Fig. 9. Histograms of ship length, ship speed and lateral distribution of the marine traffic passing the Great Belt Bridge in 2019.  
Fig. 10. Number of ships (y-axis) versus the length distribution of the ship types (x-axis) that passed under the Great Belt Bridge in 2019.  
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possibilities with the methodology. They were designed based on similar 
ship fairway-bridge crossings. The results presented in Table 8 show that 
both these actions have a positive effect on reducing the number of 
accidents. The reason why the allision energy is significantly reduced is 
simply because many of the allision cases in set 1A did not occur for the 
miss of turning point event, which formerly gave the largest collision 
energies. It should be noted that the suggested mitigation actions have 
not been confirmed as realistic measures to be enforced in the area; 
however, with the methodology presented in this study, it is shown that 
they are worth investigating further, especially if marine traffic density 
and ship sizes continue to increase in the area. This is also supported by 
Pedersen et al. (2020), who recommended doing scenario-based simu-
lations as a preparation for future changes and estimations of ship traffic 
situations and risk assessments. 
6.4. Sensitivity analysis 
A sensitivity study analysis was carried out to investigate how the 
probabilities and duration time parameters from the simulation sets 
Table 4 
List of ships modelled in the simulator and used in the case study; σ = standard deviation and μ = mean value.  
Ship type Length (m) Beam (m) Draught (m) Displacement (tonnes) μ speed, (knots) σ speed, (knots) North going South going 
Container 134 21 7.13 7,698 14.6 2.25 246 183 
Container 170 26 9.3 23,027 14.3 2.81 540 315 
Container 255 36 10.2 55,727 15.3 2.35 268 268 
General Cargo 73 12 4.1 4,850 9.3 3.76 1,896 2,022 
General Cargo 125 18 6.8 13,048 10.3 2.72 643 595 
General Cargo 161 25 9.1 30,056 13.4 2.76 2,491 1,523 
Bulk 169 27 9.23 55,459 11.5 1.78 790 339 
Bulk 226 33 12.8 72,611 11.3 1.53 441 93 
Tanker 79 13 4.8 6,538 10.2 1.97 136 131 
Tanker 132 21 7.6 12,617 12.0 1.89 496 506 
Tanker 178 28 9.9 57,870 12.6 1.70 1,545 374 
Tanker 241 41 12 78,459 11.8 1.67 395 220 
Tanker 260 45 11.8 164,820 11.8 2.00 481 365 
RoPax 194 30 6.5 29,500 17.5 2.66 685 580 
RoPax 252 31 6.5 36,256 16.9 1.66 485 462  
Fig. 11. Wind rose plot presenting the probability of wind speeds and wind 
directions. Data source: Copernicus Marine Service (2020), 
reanalysis-era5-single-levels. 
Fig. 12. Current rose plot presenting the probability of current speeds and 
current directions. Data source: Copernicus Marine Service (2020), 
BALTICSEA_ANALYSIS_FORECAST_PHY_003_006. 
Fig. 13. Probability of occurrence of the wave height (m) at latitude 
55.0–56.0◦ and longitude 10.4–11.4◦. Data source: Copernicus Marine Service 
(2020), GLOBAL_REANALYSIS_WAV_001_032-TDS, period 1993 to 2018. 
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affect the results, except for 1B, 1C, 5 and 6. Those sets were excluded 
because there was no need to include all the random seed simulation sets 
or the simulation sets that were defined for the mitigation study. The 
results are presented in Table 9. 
Simulation sets 2 and 4 were based on the event statistics from the 
TSS Bornholmsgat area. Set 2 has a higher probability for drifting ship 
compared to simulation set 1A. This increased the number of groundings 
and allisions by about 25 percent. It did not, however, affect the 1,000- 
year allision energy. Set 3 has a 50 percent higher probability for sharp 
turning ship compared to simulation set 1A, which also showed a minor 
increase in the number of groundings and allisions but no influence on 
the 1,000-year allision energy. 
For the miss of turning point in set 4A, the case study simulations 
show that this event has the largest influence and is, thereby, the most 
sensitive to the results. The increase of probability and duration were 
separated into 4B and 4C, to further investigate this event type and its 
effect on the result. An increase of only the event probability from 1.55 
× 10− 4 to 2.1 × 10− 4 raised the number of allisions caused by miss of 
turning point from 0.25 percent per year to 0.32 percent per year and the 
expected 1,000-year allision energy by approximate 13 percent. How-
ever, an increase of the average duration from 0.064 h to 0.19 h affected 
the number of allisions by 2,900 percent and the expected 1,000-year 
allision energy by 251 percent. A comparison between the allision en-
ergy from sets 4C and 1A is illustrated in Fig. 16. An allision energy of 
approximately 4,268 MJ represents a 260 m tanker with 164,820 DWT 
at ship speed 14 knots or a larger tanker with 237,100 DWT at ship speed 
12 knots. 
The results in Fig. 16 show that some of the results are sensitive to the 
value of the parameter duration time, especially for the event miss of 
turning point. This has not been studied in detail in similar in-
vestigations and models within the same research area (e.g. Goerlandt 
and Kujala, 2011; Hansen et al., 2013; van Dorp and Merrick, 2011). It is 
recommended that a stronger emphasis should be placed on this 
parameter in future work, as the manner which the duration time varies 
for different ship traffic areas, ship types and sizes should be studied in 
more depth. 
6.5. Applicability of proposed methodology 
In Chapter 4, the methods described in Chapter 3 were used to obtain 
event statistics in two areas. These areas have their differences when it 
comes to geography; however, they are both considered to be open sea 
and have well-defined sailing paths (partly regulated by TSS). Another 
area with well-defined sailing paths is the Kiel Canal; the methods to 
identify events were applied in this area, as well, but it was concluded 
that the methods were not applicable here. With the assumption that all 
the events led to accidents, and that all the accidents here were reported, 
the accidents from 2017 reported to IHS Fairplay and EMCIP were 
studied. The records give a higher frequency here for the loss of pro-
pulsion and rudder failure, but they are in the same magnitude as in the 
areas included in this paper. Although, it should also be noted that 
rudder failures in the accident records include more types of events than 
described in Chapter 3.2. 
There are other events that were not investigated in the study that 
could result in an allision. One example of such an event is “cowboy 
ships”, which was introduced by Pyman et al. (1983). The event defines 
ships that do not follow the intended navigation path and make turns at 
wrong locations in the fairway and traffic scheme. The cause behind the 
event could be crew/captains influenced by alcohol, malfunction of 
navigation aids, acts of terrorism, etc. This type of event was excluded 
from the study, since no method was found to model, identify and 
quantify the event. Another example of event that was not considered in 
the study is the category IV scenario proposed in Pedersen et al. (1995, 
2020), which refers to a ship that makes an evasive manoeuvre because 
of another ship near a bridge. This event was not considered in the study 
for the same reasons as the cowboy ship event. 
Compared to previous research and methods in, e.g., Ulusçu et al. 
(2009), van Dorp and Merrick (2011) and Goerlandt and Kujala (2011), 
Table 5 
Overview and definition of ten simulation sets run in the SEAMAN simulator. The parameters of the events and their details are presented in Chapters 4.1 and 4.2.  
ID Seed Description of event and simulation set 
1A 0 Drifting ship – probability: 0.65 × 10− 4; duration: σ = 0.71, ι = 0.021, λ = 0.69 
Sharp turning ship – probability: 0.70 × 10− 5; duration: σ = 1.2, ι = 0.06, λ = 0.54 
Miss of turning point – probability: 1.55 × 10− 5; duration: σ = 0.015, μ = 0.064 
1B 1 
1C 2 
2 0 Drifting ship – probability: 0.91 × 10− 4; duration: σ = 1.2, ι = 0.1, λ = − 0.4 
The other events were modelled as defined in set 1 
3 0 Sharp turning ship – probability: 1.05 × 10− 5 
The other events were modelled as defined in set 1 
4A 0 Miss of turning point – probability: 2.1 × 10− 4, duration: σ = 0.047, μ = 0.19 
The other events were modelled as defined in set 1 
4B 0 Miss of turning point – probability: 2.1 × 10− 4, duration for miss of turning point and the other events were modelled as defined in set 1 
4C 0 Miss of turning point – duration: σ = 0.047 μ = 0.19, probability for miss of turning point and the other events were modelled as defined in set 1 
5 0 Maximum ship speed: 12 
Event probabilities and durations as defined in set 1 
6 0 Longer straight navigation distance prior to the bridge 
Event probabilities and durations as defined in set 1  
Table 6 
Results from simulation sets 1A, 1B and 1C with YR = 10,000.  














1A 395,770 5,165 59 2,308 MJ 1,220 MJ 
1B 395,770 5,214 67 2,315 MJ 1,620 MJ 
1C 395,770 5,065 56 1,967 MJ 1,403 MJ  
Table 7 
Results from simulation sets 1A, 1B and 1C with YR = 100,000; number of allision accidents caused by D = drifting ship, ST = sharp turning ship, MTP = miss of turning 
point.  
Id Number of simulations Number of groundings Number of allisions (D, ST, MTP) Maximum allision energy (MJ) 1,000-year expected allision energy (MJ) 
1A 3,959,282 50,258 710 (376, 85, 249) 3,221 1,667 
1B 3,959,282 51,198 722 (385, 97, 240) 4,634 1,601 
1C 3,959,282 51,206 730 (395, 87, 248) 2,708 1,605  
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the proposed methodology includes calculation of the hydrodynamic 
forces. It also contains methods for obtaining local event failure fre-
quencies and durations. The study has demonstrated that the proposed 
methodology can be applied to allision case studies while other models 
in the literature often emphasize open sea and coastal areas. Finally, a 
difference between the proposed methodology and equation-based 
models (e.g., Pedersen, 1995, 2020) is that the probability and conse-
quence of an event are analysed together instead of separately. 
The proposed methodology can be used both to analyse the risk of 
existing bridges and in the planning phase of new bridges. The risk 
defined in Eq. (1) has the terms (accumulated) probability and 
Fig. 14. Analysis of the effects from the parameter duration time (simulation set 1A) on the probability density distributions for all simulations, groundings and 
accidents for the three studied events. 
Fig. 15. Illustration of ten percent of the paths of ships from simulation set 1A 
that collided with the bridge. The green line represents the drifting ship event, 
the blue line the sharp turning ship event and the red line the miss of turning 
point event. (For interpretation of the references to colour in this figure legend, 
the reader is referred to the Web version of this article.) 
Table 8 
Results from simulation sets 1A (reference), 5 and 6 with YR = 100,000; number 
of allision accidents caused by D = drifting ship, ST = sharp turning ship, MTP =
miss of turning point.  















1A 3,959,282 50,258 710 (376, 
85, 249) 
3,221 1,667 
5 3,959,282 32,003 436 (347, 
89, 0) 
1,030 12 
6 3,962,135 50,255 484 (402, 
82, 0) 
2,258 22  
Table 9 
Results from simulation sets 1A (reference), 2, 3 and 4 with YR = 100,000; 
number of allision accidents caused by D = drifting ship, ST = sharp turning 
ship, MTP = miss of turning point.  















1A 3,959,282 50,258 710 (376, 
85, 249) 
3,221 1,667 
2 4,221,089 65,516 985 (651, 
85, 249) 
3,221 1,667 
3 3,994,525 54,268 800 (376, 
175, 249) 
3,221 1,667 




4B 5,169,542 60,662 777 (376, 
85, 316) 
3,221 1,880 
4C 3,959,282 748,053 20,606 
(376, 85, 
20,145) 
5,054 4,179  
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consequence, which were also analysed for each simulation case in the 
methodology. This definition of risk and the way to present accumulated 
probability in Fig. 16 is similar to Johansen and Askeland (2019) who 
used an FN-curve as the design criterion for bridge design. Note that the 
FN-curve has the number of fatalities on the x-axis and Fig. 16 has the 
allision energy. In future research, the allision energy could be trans-
lated to damages to the bridge and thereafter converted to number of 
fatalities. 
7. Conclusions 
The study presented a methodology using AIS data, a ship manoeu-
vring simulator and the Monte Carlo method to calculate the accident 
probabilities in marine traffic near bridges spanning over wide water-
ways. The methodology was verified in a case study on grounding ac-
cidents, and its wider applicability was presented in a case study where 
the probability of ship-bridge allisions was calculated. With the pro-
posed methodology, ships and traffic situations that were over- 
represented in the failure event analyses in the case study’s marine 
traffic area were numerically shown, and mitigation actions were pro-
posed that can reduce the probability of ship-bridge allisions. Ships that 
represent the 1,000-year allision energy were identified, which can be 
used as target ships in bridge structural strength assessments and whose 
kinetic energy impact a bridge must withstand. 
An event-based approach was proposed for the identification of 
events that should be simulated and analysed if they can lead to a 
maritime accident. This is based on an analysis of AIS data of the traffic 
separation scheme of the area of interest. Event detection criteria for 
three events, drifting ship, sharp turning ship and miss of turning point, 
were proposed. The marine traffic areas Great Belt VTS and TSS Born-
holmsgat were analysed to estimate the event frequency. The results 
were compared with results in Rasmussen et al. (2012), and there was 
good agreement for the drifting ship and miss of turning point events. 
For the sharp turning ship event, too few events in the AIS data were 
found to form representative statistical conclusions. 
The Great Belt VTS area was used in a verification study that 
confirmed that the methodology could predict the probability of ship 
groundings corresponding to the accident statistics from the past ten 
years in the same area. It was concluded that the presented methodology 
can be used to simulate and analyse traffic situation schemes in costal 
waterways to calculate the probability that a ship accident will occur. 
The ship-bridge allision case study of the Great Belt Bridge showed in 
a sensitivity study that the parameter duration time of an event has a 
large influence on the results. It is thus recommended to carry out a 
parametric sensitivity study of this parameter. In the current case study, 
it was shown to have a relatively large influence, especially on the miss 
of turning point event and the subsequent way the ship’s situation in the 
simulator runs evolved. 
A sensitivity study of the number of simulated traffic years showed 
that 100,000 traffic years were required to satisfy the convergence cri-
terion defined in the study. The probability for a ship allision against the 
Great Belt Bridge was calculated to be 0.007. An analysis of all ship- 
bridge allision cases showed that it was dominated by the drifting ship 
event. The expected allision energy for the 1,000-year allision was 
calculated to be 1,624 MJ, which can be represented by a 178 m tanker 
with 57,870 DWT and ship speed 14.6 knots. However, if the duration of 
the event miss of turning point was increased to the same duration as in 
the TSS Bornholmsgat the expected allision energy for a 1,000-year 
allision was increased to 4,268 MJ, which can be represented by a 
260 m tanker with 164,820 DWT at ship speed 14 knots or a larger 
tanker with 237,100 DWT at ship speed 12 knots. 
Two mitigation actions were studied: change of the traffic separation 
scheme and limitation of the ship speed. Both of these actions will give 
the crew more time to act and react in case they lose the manoeu-
vrability of the ship; hence, the probability of an allision was reduced. 
The methodology presented in the study and its results show that it 
can be applied either in the planning phase of a new bridge over a 
waterway if the AIS data in the area are known, or in the assessment of 
marine traffic situations near existing bridges where the marine traffic 
may have changed since they were designed and built. The methodology 
is not limited to ship-bridge allisions; it can also be used to assess the 
probability of collisions with other infrastructures offshore or other 
Fig. 16. A log-log diagram presenting the probability of allision energy for the simulation sets 1A and 4C for the three studied events. The allision energy is 
calculated in accordance with Eq. (4). 
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marine accidents, such as ship groundings. 
The event failure probability can be included directly in other 
navigational risk assessment methods to assess the risk of collision when 
vessels are close to each other. In future research, the methodology 
should be developed to include multiple ships in the simulation models, 
and implement active decision support how other ships can meet and 
interact more safely in fairways which high traffic density. This exten-
sion of the simulation methodology would offer a possibility to simulate 
and analyse the probabilities and consequences of ship-ship collisions. 
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